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Executive Summary
Ingenuity, knowledge, and organization alter but cannot cancel humanity’s vulnerability to inva-
sion by parasitic forms of life. Infectious disease which antedated the emergence of humankind
will last as long as humanity itself, and will surely remain, as it has been hitherto, one of the
fundamental parameters and determinants of human history.
— William H. McNeill in  Plagues and Peoples, 1976
Summary
The spectrum of infectious disease is changing rapidly in conjunction with
dramatic societal and environmental changes. Worldwide, explosive population
growth with expanding poverty and urban migration is occurring; international
travel and commerce are increasing; and technology is rapidly changing—all of
which affect the risk of exposure to infectious agents.
Recent examples of important emerging infectious diseases include pro-
longed diarrheal illness due to waterborne Cryptosporidium, hemorrhagic colitis
and renal failure from foodborne Escherichia coli O157:H7, pneumonia and
middle-ear infections caused by drug-resistant pneumococci, and rodentborne
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome. These diseases as well as resurgent diseases
(e.g., tuberculosis and cholera) illustrate human vulnerability to microorganisms
in the environment. Three recent reports by the Institute of Medicine document
the need to address emerging infectious disease threats.
In partnership with representatives from health departments, other federal
agencies, medical and public health professional associations, and international
organizations, CDC has developed a strategic plan to address emerging infec-
tious disease threats. The plan contains four goals that emphasize surveillance,
applied research, prevention and control, and public health infrastructure. To en-
sure sustainability, plan implementation will be approached in stages, as a
long-term endeavor with emphasis on extramural programs. As health-care re-
form proceeds, priority should be given to strengthening partnerships between
health-care providers, microbiologists, and public health professionals to detect
and control emerging infectious diseases.
INTRODUCTION
Once expected to be eliminated as a public health problem, infectious diseases re-
main the leading cause of death and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) worldwide
(1 ) and are among the leading causes of death in the United States (2 ). Dramatic
changes in society, technology, and the environment, together with the diminished
effectiveness of certain approaches to disease control, usher in an era wherein the
spectrum of infectious diseases is expanding, and many infectious diseases once
thought to be controlled are increasing (Box 1).
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The term “emerging infectious diseases” refers to diseases of infectious origin
whose incidence in humans has either increased within the past two decades or
threatens to increase in the near future (3 ). To effectively address emerging infectious
diseases, CDC has developed a strategic plan emphasizing surveillance, research, and
prevention activities necessary to maintain a strong defense against infectious dis-
eases that affect, or threaten to affect, the public’s health.
The goals of this plan address priorities for surveillance, applied research, preven-
tion and control, and public health infrastructure, respectively:
Goal I. Detect, promptly investigate, and monitor emerging pathogens, the dis-
eases they cause, and the factors influencing their emergence.
Goal II. Integrate laboratory science and epidemiology to optimize public health
practice.
Goal III. Enhance communication of public health information about emerging dis-
eases and ensure prompt implementation of prevention strategies.
Goal IV. Strengthen local, state, and federal public health infrastructures to support
surveillance and implement prevention and control programs.
BOX 1. Examples of emerging infectious diseases, 1993
Diseases in the United States
• Coccidioidomycosis
• Cryptosporidiosis
• Drug-resistant pneumococcal disease
• Escherichia coli O157:H7 disease
• Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
• Influenza A/Beijing/32/92
• Vancomycin-resistant enterococcal infections
Diseases outside the United States
• Cholera, Latin America
• Dengue, Costa Rica
• Diphtheria, Russia
• E. coli O157:H7, South Africa and Swaziland
• Multidrug-resistant Shigella dysenteriae, Burundi
• Rift Valley fever, Egypt
• Vibrio cholerae O139, Asia
• Yellow fever, Kenya
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BACKGROUND
The Concept of Emergence
Many factors or combinations of factors can contribute to disease emergence.
Newly emergent infectious diseases may result from changes in or evolution of exist-
ing organisms; known diseases may spread to new geographic areas or human
populations; or previously unrecognized infections may appear in persons living or
working in areas undergoing ecologic changes (e.g., deforestation or reforestation)
that increase human exposure to insects, animals, or environmental sources that may
harbor new or unusual infectious agents (Table 1) (4–7 ). 
Infectious diseases may reemerge because of either the development of antimicro-
bial resistance in existing agents (e.g., gonorrhea, malaria, pneumococci) or
breakdowns in public health measures for previously controlled infections (e.g., chol-
era, tuberculosis, and pertussis) (3 ).
The Burden of Infectious Diseases
In the United States and elsewhere, infectious diseases increasingly threaten public
health and contribute substantially to the escalating costs of health care. For example,
childhood ear infections are the leading cause of patient visits to pediatricians, and the
incidence of visits for these infections increased 150% during 1975–1990 (8 ). In addi-
tion, infectious agents may be causing diseases previously considered noninfectious:
Helicobacter pylori has a well-established association with peptic ulcer disease and
gastritis (9 ); sexually transmitted human papillomavirus is associated with cervical
cancer (10 ); and infection with hepatitis C virus—now recognized as a leading cause
of chronic liver disease and cirrhosis in the United States—occurs in an estimated
150,000 persons annually (11 ). Chlamydia infections have long been implicated in in-
fertility and, more recently, have been tentatively associated with coronary artery
TABLE 1. Factors contributing to emergence of infectious diseases*
Categories Specific examples
Societal events Economic impoverishment; war or civil conflict; population
growth and migration; urban decay
Health care New medical devices; organ or tissue transplantation; drugs
causing immunosuppression; widespread use of antibiotics
Food production Globalization of food supplies; changes in food processing,
packaging, and preparation
Human behavior Sexual behavior; drug use; travel; diet; outdoor recreation;
use of day care facilities
Environmental changes Deforestation/reforestation; changes in water ecosystems;
flood/drought; famine; global warming
Public health infrastructure Curtailment or reduction of prevention programs; inadequate
communicable disease surveillance; lack of trained
personnel (e.g., epidemiologists, laboratory scientists, and
vector and rodent control specialists)
Microbial adaptation 
and change
Changes in virulence and toxin production; development of
drug resistance; microbes as cofactors in chronic diseases
*Adapted from reference 3.
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disease (12 ), and rodentborne hantaviruses may play a role in hypertensive renal
disease (13 ).
Infectious diseases account for 25% of all visits to physicians each year, and antimi-
crobial agents are the second most frequently prescribed class of drugs in the United
States. (14,15 ). Direct and indirect costs of infectious diseases (e.g., economic losses
and days of disability) may exceed an estimated $120 billion. Such approximations,
however, most likely underestimate the burden of infectious diseases. For example,
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) distributes infectious diseases
across several categories, obscuring their public health impact (e.g., the classification
of endocarditis among cardiovascular diseases and the classification of meningitis
and middle-ear infections among diseases of the nervous system and sense organs,
respectively).
The Threat of Emerging Infections
As a consequence of changes in society, technology, and the environment, patho-
gens evolve or spread, and the spectrum of infectious diseases expands. Emerging
infections, such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), illustrate that no nation can be complacent regarding human vul-
nerability to microorganisms in the environment. Since the early 1970s, the U.S.
public health system has been challenged by other newly identified pathogens and
syndromes, such as Legionnaires’ disease, Lyme disease, toxic shock syndrome,
hepatitis C virus, and, most recently, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (16–23 ). More-
over, the incidence of many diseases widely presumed to be under control—such as
cholera (24 ), dengue (25 ), yellow fever (26 ), and tuberculosis (TB) (27,28 )—has in-
creased in many areas or spread to new regions or populations throughout the world.
Because of widespread use and misuse of antimicrobial drugs, their effectiveness in
treating common bacterial infections is diminishing, resulting in prolonged illnesses,
higher mortality rates, and higher health-care costs (Figure 1) (29–35 ).
Emerging infections are particularly serious in persons with lowered immunity,
such as those infected with HIV and those receiving immunosuppressive therapy for
cancer or organ transplantation—populations whose numbers are increasing (Figure
2). Other groups that may be disproportionately affected by emerging infections in-
clude the elderly; persons being cared for in institutional settings, such as hospitals
and nursing homes; and persons with inadequate access to health care, such as the
homeless, migrant farm workers, and others of low socioeconomic status.
The number of children attending day care facilities has increased in the past dec-
ade as more mothers of young children have entered the work force. These children,
now numbering more than 11 million, are at a substantially increased risk for enteric
infections, such as hepatitis A, giardiasis, and cryptosporidiosis; acute respiratory ill-
nesses; and middle-ear infections. Also, children who become infected can infect
other members of a household (36 ).
Emerging infections transmitted by contaminated public water supplies place en-
tire communities at risk. In the spring of 1993, contamination of a municipal water
supply with the intestinal parasite Cryptosporidium caused the largest recognized out-
break of waterborne illness in the history of the United States; an estimated 403,000
persons in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, had prolonged diarrhea, and approximately 4,400
persons required hospitalization (personal communication, Jeffrey P. Davis, commu-
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FIGURE 1. Percentage of nosocomial enterococci reported as resistant to vancomycin
isolated from infections in patients in intensive-care units (ICUs) and non-ICUs, by
year — National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance system, 1989–March 31, 1993*
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FIGURE 2. Number of organ transplants — United States, 1982–1992 
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nicable disease epidemiologist, Wisconsin). Large segments of populations may also
be exposed to emerging infections through contaminated food products. For exam-
ple, in 1993, hamburgers contaminated with the bacterial pathogen Escherichia coli
O157:H7 and served at a fast-food restaurant chain caused a multistate outbreak of
hemorrhagic colitis (bloody diarrhea) and serious kidney disease, resulting in the
deaths of at least four children (37,38 ). 
Limitations in both surveillance and the availability of appropriate diagnostic tests
constrain public health efforts to prevent and control outbreaks. Both E. coli O157:H7
and Cryptosporidium were first recognized as important human pathogens in the
early 1980s, but neither has received adequate public health attention (Figure 3).
Exposure to certain animals also poses a risk for emerging infectious diseases.
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, first recognized in the southwestern United States
in 1993, has been linked to exposure to infected rodents in more than a dozen states.
More than 60 cases have been detected; of those, more than half have died (Figure 4)
(20–23 ).
Once considered “exotic,” tropical infectious diseases are having an increasing
effect on the U.S. public. Recent examples include severe illness and at least one
death due to cholera among international airline passengers arriving in California (39);
malaria among residents of southern California and immigrants in North Carolina
(40,41 ); fever and heart failure in New York and Canada among patients who received
blood transfusions contaminated with the bloodborne parasite (Trypanosoma cruzi )
that causes Chagas’ disease in Latin America (42,43 ); and a newly described form of
leishmaniasis among troops returning from the Persian Gulf conflict (44,45 ).
From a historical perspective, cholera, smallpox, and plague are examples of infec-
tious diseases that spread globally with devastating impact, often during periods of
rapid economic change or population growth (7 ). Today, travel and commerce have
fostered the worldwide spread of pathogens such as HIV/AIDS and influenza, as well
as the reemergence of cholera as a global health threat—consistent with a perspective
that “the microbe that felled one child in a distant continent yesterday can reach yours
today and seed a global pandemic tomorrow” (46 ). These examples underscore the
fact that emerging infections can affect persons in geographically widespread areas,
regardless of factors such as lifestyle, cultural or ethnic background, or socioeco-
nomic status.
Preparing to Confront Emerging Infections
The public health infrastructure is insufficiently prepared to confront today’s
emerging disease problems. Domestic surveillance systems for most infectious dis-
eases are inadequate and global surveillance is fragmentary at best. For example,
foodborne and waterborne disease outbreaks may be either unrecognized or detected
late, and the magnitude of the problem of antimicrobial drug resistance is unknown.
Surveillance of infectious diseases in the United States depends on voluntary col-
laboration between CDC and state and local health departments, which depend on
reporting by health-care professionals of a limited number of specific, recognized in-
fectious diseases. Reporting is generally incomplete. Results of a recent survey
conducted by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists underscore the in-
adequacy of existing infectious disease surveillance by documenting the limited
number of professional positions dedicated to infectious disease surveillance in most
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states. For example, in 12 of the 50 states surveyed, no professional position is dedi-
cated to surveillance of foodborne and waterborne diseases. Funding for infectious
disease surveillance is restricted primarily to diseases for which public health crises
have already developed. In 1992, more than 95% of federal funds allocated to states
for infectious disease surveillance were targeted to four disease categories (i.e., TB,
HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases [STDs], and selected vaccine-preventable dis-
eases) (personal communication, M. Osterholm, Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists survey on surveillance). However, no federal resources are provided
to state and local health departments to support the national notifiable disease sys-
tem. In addition, the ability of state public health laboratories to support the
surveillance and control of infectious diseases has diminished (47 ).
Timely recognition of emerging infections requires early warning systems to detect
such problems so they may be promptly investigated and controlled before they
evolve into public health crises. Prompt detection of these new threats depends on
careful monitoring by effective surveillance systems; on a thorough understanding of
trends in incidence and distribution of known infectious agents; and on effective com-
munication among clinicians, clinical laboratory personnel, and public health
professionals.
The ability to detect what is new or reemerging depends on the capacity to identify
and track both the routine and the unusual. Like radar or “early warning” systems that
detect threats to national security, surveillance with appropriate laboratory support is
a critical element in the effective defense against these diseases. Surveillance systems
Cases of HPS*
P. maniculatus
*Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome.
FIGURE 4. Distribution of Peromyscus maniculatus and number of recognized cases
of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, selected geographic regions, as of March 23,
1994
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are the most important tools for determining which infectious diseases are emerging
or receding.
Effective surveillance also provides a basis for evaluating the outcome of both pub-
lic health and personal medical-care programs. Surveillance information is essential
to ensure the use of the most efficacious and cost-effective approaches to preventive,
as well as curative, health care. Regardless of the direction of health-care reform, sur-
veillance will be critical to the meaningful evaluation of new prevention programs.
In addition to comprehensive and innovative surveillance systems, effective prepa-
ration for detecting, preventing, and controlling emerging infectious diseases requires
sound foundations in professional expertise, laboratory support, and research capa-
bility to strengthen the infrastructure needed to address the ongoing, but often
changing, threats from emerging infections. Despite the continued emergence of such
threats, support for applied research and control efforts has declined over the past
decade.
Three recent reports by expert committees convened by the National Academy of
Science’s Institute of Medicine (IOM) have indicated that the ability of the U.S. public
health system and health professionals to address emerging infectious disease prob-
lems is in jeopardy (3,48,49 ). The earliest of these reports, “The U.S. Capacity to
Address Tropical Infectious Disease Problems” (48 ), documented the inadequate
state of readiness to recognize, treat, or control infectious disease threats emanating
from the tropics—regions that have yielded microbial threats such as Lassa fever and
Ebola viruses, chloroquine-resistant malaria, and penicillin-resistant gonorrhea. The
second report, “The Future of Public Health,” concluded that the U.S. public health
system is in disarray. This report emphasized that the U.S. approach to public health
has too often been crisis driven, an approach that is costly because it constrains the
institution of cost-saving preventive strategies (49 ).
The third IOM report, “Emerging Infections, Microbial Threats to Health in the
United States,” emphasized the ongoing threat to domestic and global health from
emerging infectious diseases (3 ). The report provided specific recommendations for
CDC, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Depart-
ment of Defense, and other federal and state agencies for addressing microbial
threats to health in the United States and elsewhere. This report emphasized a critical
leadership role for CDC in a national and global effort to detect and control emerging
infectious disease threats.
THE CDC PREVENTION STRATEGY
To effectively detect and prevent emerging infections, improvements are needed in
public health systems, program design, and infrastructure. To accomplish these im-
provements and to achieve the objectives of Healthy People 2000, CDC has developed
a strategy to address these microbial threats. Because meeting the broad challenge of
emerging infections requires interaction, cooperation, and coordination among a
wide range of public and private organizations, the development of this strategy has
taken place in partnership with state and local health departments, other federal agen-
cies, academic institutions, health-care providers, medical laboratory personnel, and
international organizations.
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The prevention strategy outlined in this document contains four critical goals that
address, in a broader context, specific IOM recommendations for revitalizing the abil-
ity to identify, contain, and, most importantly, prevent illness from emerging
infectious diseases (Box 2).
Goal I (Surveillance) emphasizes the improvement and expansion of surveillance
capabilities for infectious diseases in the United States and internationally. This goal
includes plans for strengthening local and state public health programs for infectious
disease surveillance, establishing provider-based sentinel surveillance networks, and
creating population-based Emerging Infections Epidemiology and Prevention Centers
at different sites throughout the United States (Table 2). Also included are plans for a
global consortium of closely linked epidemiology/biomedical research centers to pro-
mote the detection, monitoring, and investigation of emerging infections (Box 3).
Other objectives emphasize improved detection and monitoring of trends in antimi-
crobial resistance in both institutional and community settings; expansion of field
investigations and epidemic response capabilities; prevention of foodborne and wa-
terborne infectious diseases and improved knowledge of the distribution of animal
reservoirs and vectors associated with human infectious diseases.
Goal II (Applied Research) focuses on applied research and the integration of labo-
ratory science and epidemiology with public health practice. Emphasis is placed on
determining how behavioral factors influence exposure to new infections; better char-
acterizing the health burden of both well-established and emerging infections; and
evaluating the effectiveness and economic benefit of strategies to prevent emerging
infectious diseases. An additional focus is the development and application of im-
proved laboratory techniques for the identification of new pathogens and the
expanded use of molecular epidemiologic techniques in investigating emerging dis-
eases. Supporting the national Childhood Immunization Initiative by conducting
vaccine efficacy studies and improving rapid response capabilities for vaccine devel-
opment and delivery is also a priority. A final focus is the reestablishment of CDC
extramural programs to promote effective partnerships with public agencies, univer-
sities, and private industry and to support applied research in surveillance,
epidemiology, and prevention of emerging infections.
Goal III (Prevention and Control) addresses enhanced communication of public
health information and the implementation of prevention strategies for emerging in-
fections. Highlighted under this goal are proposals for expanded dissemination of the
MMWR , as well as other important public health information sources. Another prior-
ity is the creation of an accessible and comprehensive infectious disease database for
the United States that increases awareness of infectious diseases and promotes pub-
lic health action. The database will contain current information on topics such as
antimicrobial resistance, foodborne and waterborne disease outbreaks, travelers’
health, antimicrobial drug availability, vaccine-preventable diseases, and vaccine
guidelines. This goal also addresses the development and implementation of guide-
lines for preventing emerging infectious diseases and the provision of critical
prevention materials.
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BOX 2. Summary of goals and objectives for preventing illness from emerging
infectious diseases
Goal I: Surveillance
Detect, promptly investigate, and monitor emerging pathogens, the diseases they cause, and
the factors influencing their emergence.
Objectives:
• Expand and coordinate surveillance systems for the early detection, tracking, and evaluation
of emerging infections in the United States.
• Develop more effective international surveillance networks for the anticipation, recogni-
tion, control, and prevention of emerging infectious diseases.
• Improve surveillance and rapid laboratory identification to ensure early detection of
antimicrobial resistance.
• Strengthen and integrate programs to monitor and prevent emerging infections associ-
ated with food/water, new technology, and environmental sources.
• Strengthen and integrate programs to monitor, control, and prevent emerging vector-
borne and zoonotic diseases.
Goal II: Applied Research
Integrate laboratory science and epidemiology to optimize public health practice.
Objectives:
• Expand epidemiologic and prevention effectiveness research.
• Improve laboratory and epidemiologic techniques for the rapid identification of new
pathogens and syndromes.
• Ensure timely development, appropriate use, and availability of diagnostic tests and re-
agents.
• Augment rapid response capabilities for vaccine production and delivery and expand
evaluation of vaccine efficacy and the cost effectiveness of vaccination programs.
Goal III: Prevention and Control
Enhance communication of public health information about emerging diseases and ensure
prompt implementation of prevention strategies.
Objectives:
• Use diverse communication methods for wider and more effective delivery of critical pub-
lic health messages.
• Establish the mechanisms and partnerships needed to ensure the rapid and effective
development and implementation of prevention measures.
Goal IV: Infrastructure 
Strengthen local, state, and federal public health infrastructures to support surveillance and
implement prevention and control programs.
Objectives:
• Ensure the ready availability of the professional expertise and support personnel needed
to better understand, monitor, and control emerging infections.
• Make available state-of-the-art physical resources (e.g., laboratory space, training facili-
ties, and equipment) needed to safely and effectively support the preceding goals and
objectives.
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Goal IV (Infrastructure) deals with issues relating to local, state, and federal infra-
structure, particularly personnel and physical resources. Points of emphasis include
maintaining expertise in rare or unusual infectious diseases and establishing training
programs that emphasize the diagnosis of infectious diseases. A public health labora-
tory fellowship in infectious diseases is proposed. Also emphasized is the need for
state-of-the-art physical resources such as laboratory space, training facilities, and
equipment. Laboratory capabilities must be maintained in a manner that optimizes
flexibility and “surge capacity” so that unanticipated public health threats can be ade-
quately, efficiently, and safely addressed. Plans for expanding facilities for
maintaining specimen banks of etiologic agents and clinical specimens are also a
priority.
IMPLEMENTATION
This plan reflects CDC’s commitment to meet the urgent public health challenge of
important emerging infectious diseases. The need to proceed rapidly is made more
urgent for many reasons. Many diseases pose an immediate danger. For example,
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, a common cause of hospital infections,
may potentially develop resistance to vancomycin (29,50 ); penicillin resistance is
spreading in Streptococcus pneumoniae (29,31,51 ); the potential exists for extension
of the current cholera epidemic in Latin America to the Caribbean Islands (24 ); and
Vibrio cholerae O139, a new strain for which existing cholera vaccines are ineffective
and prior infection with V. cholerae O1 affords no protection, is spreading throughout
TABLE 2. Potential projects for Emerging Infections Epidemiology and Prevention
Centers, United States
Center Projects
Potential
center
locations
Unexplained
deaths of
possible
infectious
etiology in
young
adults 
Foodborne
disease
surveillance
and
prevention 
Prevention
of oppor-
tunistic
infections
in HIV-*
infected
inner-city
populations 
Drug
resistance 
in nursing
homes and
day care
facilities 
Febrile and
diarrheal
illness in
migrant
farm
workers 
Etiologic
agents of
community-
acquired
pneumonia 
Northeast X X X
Mid-Atlantic X X X X X
Southeast X X X X
South X X X X X
Midwest X X X X
Southwest X X X X
West X X X X X
Northwest X X X X X
U.S. Pacific
Islands X X X
U.S. Carib-
bean
Islands X X X
*Human immunodeficiency virus.
12 MMWR April 15, 1994
southern Asia (Figure 5) (52,53 ). Changing food-industry practices, dietary choices,
and globalization of food supplies will bring new challenges to provide a diet safe
from pathogens such as Salmonella sp. and E. coli O157:H7 (37,38,54–57 ). Ongoing
investigations of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome document that the geographic dis-
tribution of this infection goes beyond the desert Southwest (23 ). These infectious
disease problems emphasize the necessity of expeditiously implementing this plan
through a balanced intramural and extramural effort.
The implementation of the goals and objectives in this plan is relevant to health-
care reform. Examples of relevant issues include prolonged hospitalizations caused
by hospital-acquired infections; increased morbidity and treatment costs resulting
from antimicrobial drug resistance; and excessive burdens placed on public and
private health-care delivery facilities because of community-wide outbreaks of food-
borne and waterborne infections.
Some of the activities listed in this document are already in the planning stages and
will be implemented soon. Many of the proposed activities need further development
BOX 3. Examples of potential members of a global consortium of epidemiology/
biomedical research programs/ centers
Existing networks
• CDC Field Epidemiology Training Programs
• International Clinical Epidemiology Network
• International Office of Epizootics Worldwide Information System
• Pan American Health Organization-CDC Dengue Surveillance Laboratory Network
• Pan American Health Organization Polio Eradication Laboratory Surveillance Network
• World Health Organization Arbovirus and Hemorrhagic Fever Collaborating Centers
• World Health Organization Global Influenza Surveillance Network
Existing research facilities 
• Caribbean Epidemiology Centre, Trinidad
• CDC: National Center for Infectious Diseases Field Stations (Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala,
Puerto Rico, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Thailand)
• Department of Defense: U.S. Army Research Facilities (Brazil, Kenya, Thailand) and U.S.
Naval Research Facilities (Egypt, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines)
• Food and Agriculture Organization Reference Centers (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Kenya, Panama, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thai-
land, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and the United States)
• French Scientific Research Institute (e.g., Senegal, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire)
• Instituto de Nutrición para Centroamérica y Panama, Guatemala
• International Center for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh
• National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases-sup-
ported facilities (Brazil, Colombia, Israel, Mali, Mexico, Philippines, Sudan, Uganda,
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe)
• Pasteur Institutes (e.g., Algeria, Central African Republic, French Guiana, Iran, Madagas-
car, Morocco, New Caledonia, Senegal, and Vietnam)
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in full cooperation with other federal agencies, state and local health authorities, aca-
demic institutions, professional societies, private industry, and others. With this
document serving as both a guide and a first step, implementation will be based on
public health priorities and resource availability. This process will be approached in
stages, as a long-term endeavor with sustainable impact and emphasis on extramural
programs (Box 4).
The strategy of this plan is based on repeated experience demonstrating that it is
less costly to anticipate and prevent infectious disease threats than to react with ex-
pensive treatment or containment measures to public health crises. Public health
policy and practice that combine investments in surveillance, laboratory research and
training, and epidemiologic investigations with prevention and control efforts will re-
duce the impact of emerging infectious disease threats, in terms of both human
suffering and economic losses.
BOX 4. Implementation: high priorities for 1994–1996
Goal I: Surveillance
• Strengthen notifiable disease surveillance at state and local levels.
• Establish two physician-based Sentinel Surveillance Networks to detect and monitor
emerging diseases, such as unexplained adult respiratory distress syndrome, drug-
resistant pneumococcal disease, and childhood illnesses characterized by fever and rash.
• Establish four population-based Emerging Infections Epidemiology and Prevention Cen-
ters to conduct focused epidemiology/prevention projects emphasizing foodborne and
waterborne infectious diseases and potentially vaccine-preventable diseases.
• Strengthen and link four existing research facilities/networks for a global consortium to
promote the detection, monitoring, and investigation of infections emerging internation-
ally that could affect the health of U.S. residents.
Goal II: Applied Research
• Reestablish an extramural program to support emerging infectious disease prevention
and control activities, such as evaluating the role of prescribing practices in the develop-
ment of antimicrobial drug-resistant pathogens.
• Initiate prevention effectiveness studies to assess the impact of food preparation guide-
lines on the incidence of foodborne infections such as E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella
enteritidis.
Goal III: Prevention and Control
• Develop additional means to deliver laboratory and public health information informing
health professionals about emerging infections and antimicrobial drug resistance.
• Develop and implement guidelines for the prevention of opportunistic infections in
immunosuppressed persons.
Goal IV: Infrastructure
• Provide state-of-the-art training in diagnostic evaluation and testing for medical labora-
tory personnel to ensure the diagnosis and surveillance of emerging infections.
• Establish a public health laboratory fellowship in infectious diseases that will train medical
microbiologists in public health approaches to diagnosis and molecular epidemiology.
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